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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of marketing’s philosophical 
conversation over the past 120 years, focusing on the emergent meaning of the notion that 
marketing should become more “scientific”. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper focuses on the US academic marketing 
literature, primarily journal articles and books published in the first half of the 20th century. 
Findings – The Aristotelian distinction between techné, epistemé and phronesis provides a 
rich basis for framing philosophical discussion in marketing and should supplant the art – 
science debate and Anderson’s distinction between science1 and science2. Prior to 1959, the 
marketing journals provided a forum for phronesis, though this diminished, as the academic 
marketing community largely abandonedthe inductive, contextual approach in favour of a 
deductive, “scientific” methodology. The Ford Foundation played an important role in 
affecting this change. 
Practical implications – The paper highlights the importance of forums where practitioners 
canreflect on the ethical and social implications of their practices and then work to enhance 
these practicesfor the greater social good. 
Social implications – Questions the value of distinctions between marketing theorists 
andpractitioners and the consequential focus of marketing journals. 
Originality/value – Advances the concept of phronesis in the marketing literature and 
distinguishesit from epistemé, which has dominated academic marketing discourse over the 
past 60 years. 
Keywords Marketing history, Ethics, Epistemology, Phronesis, Critical marketing, Critical 
history 
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction 
When I told some colleagues I was writing about marketing’s ruminations on philosophy they 
immediately referred to the ‘science-versus-art’ debate and specifically mentioned Stephen 
Brown’s (1996) enthralling description of how that dialogue had evolved.  However, rather 
than reprising Brown’s excellent piece – or indeed other articles by Kavanagh (1994), Egan 
(2009), Saren (2010), and Hunt (this issue) – this paper seeks to relate marketing’s ‘art–
science’ debate to wider conversations about science, social science, management knowledge 
and practice, not least because the meaning of concepts like ‘science’ and ‘social science’ are 
always contested, emergent, and situated in time and place.  
According to Brown (1996), the debate about whether marketing is an art or a science was 
‘ignited’ by Paul Converse’s paper, The Development of the Science of Marketing (Converse, 
1945).  However, as Brown acknowledges, Converse’s essay was a rather routine survey of 
marketing scholars and practitioners aimed at identifying “the more important contributions to 
the science or art of marketing” (1945, p. 15) and only included “a couple of throw-away 
remarks about the ‘art or science of marketing’” (Brown, 1996, p. 90).  Indeed, a study of pre-
war marketing discourse in the United States makes it clear that there wasn’t really an art 
versus science debate, but that instead the dominant agenda within the marketing community 
was to make the discipline more ‘scientific’.   Hence, rather than structure the debate around 
the art-versus-science axis, my approach is to try to understand and contextualise what was 
meant by this idea of making marketing more ‘scientific’.  The first section of the paper, 
Science Outwith Marketing, seeks to do this by describing the particular understanding of 
science, and social science in particular, that emerged during the first half of the twentieth 
century.  The paper argues that central to this understanding was the important status 
accorded to mathematical modelling.  Crucially, this understanding was effectively absent 
from marketing discourse, which is described in the next section of the paper, Marketing 
Without Science.  This changed quite rapidly in the late 1950s and early 1960s as marketing 
academics adopted the mathematical modelling paradigm, curiously, just as it was beginning 
to lose some of its lustre elsewhere.  
The next section of the paper focuses on Paul Anderson’s important distinction between 
science1 and science2, which he first articulated in his 1983 article, Marketing, Scientific 
Progress and Scientific Method.  Drawing on Flyvberg (2001), amongst others, I argue that 
Anderson’s distinction is problematic and that it has, in many ways, led the conversation into 
something of a cul-de-sac.  Instead of the distinction between science1 and science2 – and 
 3 
indeed instead of the art–science dichotomy – Aristotle’s tripartite structure of techné-
epistemé-phronesis is presented as a richer, more fruitful basis for framing philosophical 
discussion and inquiry in the field of marketing.  In particular, I argue that marketing’s 
epistemological debate is deficient because it hasn’t engaged with the concept of phronesis, 
which should provide, not only a foundation for marketing thought, but also a vital link 
between marketing theory and practice.  The paper then proceeds to discuss a particular 
Aristotelian understanding of practice that is associated with phronesis, as developed by the 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and others such as Joseph Dunne.  The final part of the paper 
revisits marketing’s early years, through a study of early publications in the Journal of 
Marketing where we find that, while the language may have been different, there were strong 
resonances with the themes of phronesis and practice explored in this paper.  The paper 
concludes with a discussion on how this historical analysis might inform contemporary 
marketing. 
The paper is a study of the history of some of the ideas that constitute marketing thought, and 
as such it can be subjected to the routine criticisms thrown at ‘history of ideas’ projects.  In 
particular, such projects can find it hard to justify why certain events were selected from the 
infinite number of events that have happened in the past, and why particular boundaries were 
drawn.  They can also be criticised for wittingly or unwittingly endorsing existing power 
structures and for privileging some voices rather than others in the telling of a story.  This 
narrative is centred on the United States because marketing was born as an academic 
discipline there, and because the major developments during the discipline’s early period 
originated there.  The story draws largely on the available academic literature on marketing, 
especially issues of the Journal of Marketing published between 1930 and 1960.  One striking 
consequence of this is that the narrative contains no female voice.1   
Science Outwith Marketing 
The attempt to make marketing more ‘scientific’ was an ever-present theme in marketing 
discourse between 1900 and 1960.  However, to understand that endeavour we must first 
contextualise what was meant by ‘science’ during that period, and, more particularly, what 
was meant by ‘social science’, which is why we begin by focusing on debates and practices 
outside of rather than within marketing.  In this discussion it is important to remember that 
‘science’ is a concept that emerged through contestation and debate.  The meaning of the 
word was, and is, continually being reinterpreted, and so it might be proper to signal this by 
always hedging the word with scare quotes, though to do so would be distracting.  Such scare 
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quotes would surely be appropriate in the early twentieth century as a stream of major 
‘scientific’ inventions from the latter part of the nineteenth century began to diffuse through 
American society – e.g., mild steel, the telephone, lightbulb, phonograph, and automobile. A 
host of spectacular technologies were also being developed at that time, such as the airplane, 
helicopter, commercial radio, television, motion pictures, the liquid fuel rocket, aerosols, 
penicillin, while there were also profound changes in understandings of the individual, society 
and the cosmos.  Importantly, what was understood as science increasingly came to be linked 
to the application of new developments in mathematics, especially through the advances in 
probability theory and statistics that were made during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
During that period, Galton introduced the concepts of the standard deviation, regression to the 
mean, and correlation; Poincaré developed a new branch of mathematics called the 
‘qualitative study of differential equations’, which provided the basic armoury for the 
mathematical analysis of dynamic systems; Pearson (1857–1936) formulated many statistical 
techniques that are commonplace today, such as hypothesis testing, Pearson’s chi-squared 
test, and principal component analysis; while the central limit theory, which Tijms (2004, p. 
169) describes as “the unofficial sovereign of probability theory”, was proved precisely and 
formulated in general terms in 1901.   
These developments in statistics provided a growing arsenal of quantitative techniques ripe 
for application, and indeed they found ready use in two fields: biology – where a new sub-
field of mathematical biology emerged – and thermodynamics, and, in due course, scholars 
who would now be identified as social scientists looked to both of these fields as they sought 
to understand and model the social world.  A major development occurred in biology in the 
1920s, when the biophysicist and statistician Alfred Lotka and the mathematician Vito 
Volterra simultaneously and independently formulated a set of differential equations that 
modelled the dynamics of an ecological system with predator-prey interactions, competition, 
disease and mutualism.  
Thermodynamics became influential, partly through the work of Willard Gibbs (1839–1903) 
and his protégé E.B. Wilson who became a mentor to the American economist and Nobel 
Laureate Paul Samuelson.  Drawing on ideas from thermodynamics, Samuelson depicted a 
mathematical representation of economics that privileged analogies with physics, biology, 
and thermodynamic systems at or near equilibrium.  Samuelson was an occasional member of 
Harvard’s famous ‘Pareto Circle’ – named after the Italian sociologist/economist Vilfredo 
Pareto – which promulgated a mechanical-system model of society as a set of mutually 
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interdependent and interrelated components tending towards equilibrium, and which had a 
significant influence on the development of the social sciences during the 20th century (Cot, 
2011; Heyl, 1968; Isaac, 2010; Keller, 1984). 
In the same year in which the Pareto Circle was formed, 1932, the Cowles Commission for 
Research in Economics was also founded, and this institute played a defining role in the 
development of social science for the next three decades.  The objective of the Cowles 
program was to describe the workings of the economy through constructing and analysing a 
set of simultaneous equations derived from economic theory, mathematics, statistical methods 
and observed data.  It was a relatively small organisation, fluctuating in number between 30 
and 50 individuals, but it was hugely influential.   Between 1939 and 1955 the Cowles 
Commission created a “revolution” in econometrics through the work of its ‘associates’, 
twelve of whom subsequently becoming Nobel laureates (Christ, 1994). The ‘revolution’ 
spread beyond economics into fields like finance, which up to the 1950s had been dominated 
by ad hoc theories largely devoid of systematic analysis (Jensen & Smith, 1984).   
In 1955, the Cowles Commission moved from the University of Chicago to Yale University, 
which roughly coincided with the emergence of another influential group dedicated to the 
mathematical analysis of social phenomena.   This was the newly-formed Graduate School of 
Industrial Administration (GSIA) led by Lee Bach and Herbert Simon in the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology.  It differed somewhat from the Cowles Commission in that its 
commitment to inter-disciplinary research meant that it spanned more fields, but it had the 
same enthusiasm for deductive reasoning and mathematical modelling.  It was no bigger than 
the Cowles Commission but was equally, if not more influential, across a range of disciplines, 
garnering six Nobel Prizes in the process.    
The history and influence of GSIA is well known and documented (Augier & March, 2002; 
Augier & Prietula, 2007; Crowther-Heyck, 2006; Hosseini, 2003; Tadajewski, 2009), but a 
key part of the story is that it could not have happened without the financial backing of the 
Ford Foundation.  Set up in 1936 by Henry Ford’s son Edsel, it became the largest 
philanthropy in the world after it was bequeathed the non-voting stock of the Ford Motor 
Company upon the death of Edsel and Henry Ford in 1943 and 1947 respectively.  While its 
potential remit was wide, it was particularly committed to infusing scientific theory, methods 
and analysis into U.S. business administration, with the objective of winning the peace-time 
economic battles much as science was seen as vital to the war effort.  To this end, the 
Foundation’s focus was on changing the research agenda, doctoral programmes and teaching 
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approaches in US business schools, which were seen as too descriptive and ‘unscientific’.  
Beginning in 1953, the strategy was to prototype their ideas in just a small number of schools, 
one of which was GSIA (Schlossmann, Sedlak, & Wechsler, 1987).   As Augier and March 
(2011) put it, “The Ford Foundation found a poster child in GSIA, and GSIA found a sugar 
daddy” (p. 124). 
In many ways, the GSIA group were continuing the tradition of the Pareto Circle and the 
Cowles Commission in using sophisticated mathematics and statistics to deductively analyse 
social phenomena.  This pioneering work was being done by a relatively small group of 
individuals, and the Ford Foundation was the glue that sustained this social network.  Herbert 
Simon’s connections neatly illustrate this point.  Simon had completed his undergraduate 
studies in the University of Chicago where he was influenced by the logical positivist 
philosopher Rudolf Carnap, the biophysicist Nicholas Rashevsky (often seen as the founder of 
mathematical biology) and Lotka’s (1925) Elements of Physical Biology which used relatively 
sophisticated mathematics to model dynamic systems (Crowther-Heyck, 2005, p. 66).  Simon 
was especially attracted to Rashevsky’s application of complex mathematics to empirical 
problems, and much of his subsequent career can be seen as extending Rashevsky’s 
mathematical biology to social phenomena.  An early and influential example of this was his 
reworking of a model of group behaviour first proposed by George Homans (1950), one of 
the members of the Pareto Circle (Simon, 1952) (reproduced in Simon (1957/1987)).  Even 
though Homan’s model was non-mathematical, its origins were in the Pareto Circle and so it 
was suited to ‘mathematisation’, which Simon did by converting it into a set of differential 
equations from which various deductions could then be made.   
During the 1950s, Simon had spent some summers working in the RAND Corporation, which 
shared GSIA’s commitment to inter-disciplinary research, ‘big science’, mathematical 
economics, mathematical modelling, systems analysis and operations research.  At that time 
the RAND Corporation was transitioning from an original focus on military projects into 
social welfare research, a transition that was facilitated and funded by, unsurprisingly, the 
Ford Foundation. 
The Ford Foundation also provided the financial backing for the Center for Advanced Study 
in the Behavioral Sciences, which was founded in 1954.  One of that organisation’s first 
activities was to help convene a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, attended by, among others, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Kenneth Boulding, Ralph 
Gerard, and Anatol Rapoport all of whom shared an interest in the commonalities between 
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biological and cultural evolution, in the concept of general systems, and in the application of 
sophisticated mathematics to understanding such phenomena (Crowther-Heyck, 2005; 
Gerard, Kluckhohn, & Rapoport, 1956; Rapoport, 1953). From this meeting, the Society for 
General Systems Research was founded.   
All of this activity created a commonality of purpose within a relatively small academic 
community and even smaller clusters, such as the Pareto Circle (1935–1942), the Cowles 
Commission (1932–1955) and GSIA (1955–1964).  The question now, though, is where did 
the academic marketing community fit – or not fit – in this network, given that that 
community’s repeatedly stated objective, during the first half of the twentieth century, was to 
make marketing more ‘scientific’? 
Marketing Without Science 
It is very clear that, up until around 1960, the academic marketing community showed little 
interest in developing sophisticated mathematical models of market phenomena through 
appropriating techniques from biology or thermodynamics.  With few exceptions, the 
particular version of ‘science’ that favoured deductive analysis and mathematical modelling, 
which was having a profound impact elsewhere, was effectively absent from marketing.  
Instead, a quite different understanding of ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ seems to have been 
articulated in marketing, even though many might see this as ‘unscientific’.   
The German ‘historical’ school of economics, which emerged in the late 19th century, was 
especially important in the earliest years of American marketing thought (Jones & Monieson, 
1990).  The historical school saw history as the primary source of understanding about human 
actions, and took the view that, since economies are always culture-specific, economic 
‘theories’ were not generalizable over time or space. Consequently, they argued that 
economic analysis should be done through careful empirical, inductive and historical 
reasoning rather than through the use of logic, mathematics and deduction.  In short, their 
endeavours were the polar opposite to the type of work being done in GSIA.   
During the nineteenth century a large number of American students obtained their higher 
education in Germany, while many German-trained economists returned to North America in 
the latter part of that century, including Richard T. Ely who formed the American Economic 
Association in 1885.  One of Ely’s students was Edward David Jones who taught the first 
university course in marketing and who argued that the appropriate methodology for studying 
markets and marketing was “the inductive form of the scientific method” (Jones, 1913, p. 
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191). Edwin Francis Gay had also spent five years in Germany during the 1890s undertaking 
postgraduate study in history and political economy, before becoming the first Dean of 
Harvard Business School in 1908.  His enthusiasm for induction underpinned the School’s 
early and influential promotion of the case method in teaching (Jones & Monieson, 1990).    
Gay liked Frederick Taylor’s (1911/2010) ideas on ‘scientific management’ and incorporated 
them in the curriculum of the new business school (Nelson, 1992). Taylor’s book, The 
Principles of Scientific Management reflected and influenced the zeitgeist of the United States 
in the early 20th century as progressives advocated the use of ‘scientific’ methods to address 
social, technical and political problems and to improve national competitiveness through 
increasing efficiency in the workplace.   Not surprisingly, therefore, it provided a ready 
template for the application of ‘science’ and the ‘scientific’ method to marketing.  An early 
adopter of these ideas was the engineering graduate Charles Hoyt, who argued in his book, 
Scientific Sales Management (Hoyt, 1913) that the ‘old’ salesman, whose expertise was based 
on personality and contacts, should be replaced by a ‘new’ type of salesman who was 
“scientifically selected, trained, motivated and directed” (La Londe & Morrison, 1967: 10). 
Percival White expanded these ideas beyond sales management and his book, Scientific 
Marketing Management (White, 1927), was an explicit attempt to apply Taylor’s ideas in the 
wider domain of marketing (Jones & Tadajewski, 2011; Tadajewski & Jones, 2012).  Like 
Taylor and Hoyt, White was an engineer, which gave him the metaphors and mindset for his 
analysis of markets and marketing.  What he described as a ‘marketing engineer’ should solve 
marketing problems using a systematic, evidence-based approach akin to the way Taylor’s 
‘industrial engineer’ solved production problems without recourse to heuristics or rules of 
thumb (White, 1921).  White’s arguments had an important, if largely forgotten, impact on 
marketing thought and led to the development of various ‘scientific’ approaches to marketing 
practice, such as the application of time and motion study to the work of salesmen (Jones & 
Tadajewski, 2011; Nolen, 1940; Tadajewski & Jones, 2012).  However, in retrospect, the 
translation of scientific management into marketing was largely unsuccessful if we accept 
Burger’s observation in 1959 that, while manufacturing had produced scientific management 
over 50 years previously, there was still no equivalent development in marketing: “The 
essentials of scientific method are observation, deduction, hypothesis, and verification. 
Marketing, however, has yet to take the first step” (Burger, 1959, p. 246).  Moreover, 
notwithstanding the leveraging of the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’, the introduction of 
scientific management into marketing scholarship in the early 20th century might be better 
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seen as a shift from sovereign to disciplinary power, rather than anything much to do with 
‘science’ (Fougère & Skålén, 2013; Skålén, Fellesson, & Fougère, 2006).  As Taylor 
(1911/2010, p. 7) succinctly put it: “In the past the man has been first [sovereign power]; in 
the future the system must be first [disciplinary power]”. 
The prominent marketing scholars who founded the American Marketing Society (AMS) in 
1931 and the American Marketing Journal in 1934 clearly believed that marketing was 
unscientific and that this needed to change. According to Kerin (1996, p. 1) both AMS and its 
journal had two goals, one of which was to “advance science in marketing by providing for 
the systematic study and discussion of marketing problems”.  This scientific agenda was also 
manifest in the articles published in the Journal of Marketing (the successor of the American 
Marketing Journal), such as in Coutant’s (1937) paper, ‘Scientific Marketing Makes 
Progress’, in which he wrote that the AMS (of which he was then President) was “an 
organization devoted to advancing the use of science in marketing” (p. 226).  In the same 
issue, N.H. Engle (1937), then Assistant Director with the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, wrote that the Bureau’s emerging marketing research objectives were (a) focused 
on marketing research of national significance; (b) distinct from the type of research 
undertaken by private research agencies; and (c) concerned with “determining a more 
scientific marketing procedure”  (p. 282).  This focus on science and the scientific method is 
also clear from a number of other early articles in the journal, such as one by McGarry (1936) 
on ‘The Importance of Scientific Method in Advertising’ and another by Raymond (1937) 
titled ‘Direct Advertising also Favors Scientific Marketing’.   
What is clear from examining the marketing journals between 1930 and 1960 is that 
marketing scholars were not doing the type of mathematical modelling that had become 
fashionable in other fields in the social sciences around that time.   There were, however, a 
small number of possible exceptions that are worth highlighting. For instance in a series of 
Harvard Business Review articles, Lydon Brown (1937a, 1937b, 1937c) advocated the use of 
quantitative methods to estimate market size, though his approach was very rudimentary.  
Likewise, a number of papers were published during the 1950s explaining the potential 
application of regression analysis to marketing scholarship and practice (Ferber, 1954; Myers, 
1959), though in terms of mathematical sophistication these paled in comparison with the 
type of work being done in, for example, GSIA.  
One person who might have integrated mathematics and marketing was Paul Lazarsfeld who, 
during the 1950s, became one of the founders of mathematical sociology.  Lazarsfeld grew up 
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in Vienna where he obtained a doctorate in mathematics (on the mathematical aspects of 
Einstein’s gravitational theory) and where he directed a range of market research studies 
during the 1920s (Fullerton, 1990). He emigrated to the United States in 1933, and within a 
few years had written articles for the Harvard Business Review and the Journal of Marketing 
(Lazarsfeld, 1934, 1935, 1937), and contributed four chapters to the American Marketing 
Association’s handbook on marketing research (Wheeler, Bader, & Frederick, 1937, chapters 
3, 4, 11 and 15).  Given his mathematical abilities and his interest in understanding social 
phenomena, he would probably have been at home in GSIA or the RAND Corporation and 
might perhaps have formed an important link between their activities and the marketing 
community.  However, he drifted away from marketing scholarship after he was appointed 
Director of the Radio Project at the University of Newark in 1936.  His career flourished 
during the 1940s and 1950s, especially when he moved to Columbia University where the 
Radio Project grew into the renowned Bureau for Social Research (Jeřábek, 2001).  In 1954 
he published a collection of papers titled Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences 
(Lazarsfeld, 1954), which helped build his reputation as one of the co-founders of 
mathematical sociology.  It is perhaps telling that someone who is now seen as one of the 
most important sociologists of the 20th century seems to have stayed in the marketing 
community for a relatively short time, making no contribution to the marketing literature after 
1937. 
It is difficult to know why marketing was late in catching the mathematical modelling train, 
but the strategy of the Ford Foundation strategy was certainly crucial, given that it was 
fuelling the train through its decision to “pour large sums of money into a few reasonably 
good or promising schools of business which would then be the instruments of change for the 
rest of the field” (Howell 1966 in Augier & March (2011, p. 111)).  Thus, between 1956 and 
1961, the Ford Foundation donated $11m to Stanford and Harvard and another $11.5 to 
Chicago, Carnegie Tech, Columbia, UCLA, UC Berkeley and MIT, with the specific purpose 
of making business more scientific.  But except for Harvard, none of these had vibrant 
marketing groups, and Harvard marketing scholars were more interested in developing case 
studies than mathematical modelling around that time (McNair, 1954; Wood, 1963).  Yet, the 
Foundation’s trickle-down strategy eventually began to work, not least due to the impact of 
the faculty training seminars that it ran at the selected schools between 1957 and 1959.  These 
seminars attracted at least 1500 faculty members from 300 schools, including leading 
marketing scholars like Philip Kotler, Robert Buzzell, Frank Bass, John Howard, William 
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Lazer, Jerome McCarthy, Edgar Pessemier, Donald Shawver, and Abraham Shuchman. One 
series of seminars run by the Institute of Basic Mathematics for Application to Business – 
which was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and launched in Harvard and MIT in 1959 – to 
upgrade the leaders of doctoral business programmes was “spectacularly successful” (Wilkie, 
2002, p. 144). These seminars became a landmark effort in raising the mathematical 
competence of business educators generally (Schlossmann et al., 1987), and were of major 
importance in moulding marketing research into the form desired by the Foundation 
(Tadajewski, 2006).  Looking back, Wilkie (2002, p. 144) is clear: “there’s no question in my 
mind that even a causal [sic] tracing of the participants and their students will reveal a huge 
impact on the course of research in marketing” (Wilkie, 2002, p. 144, emphasis in original).  
Staelin echoed this when he wrote: “I cannot think of a single event that had more seminal 
impact on our field of inquiry than this year-long 1959 seminar” (Staelin, 2005). 
We can identify 1959 as a watershed year because people like Burger (1959, p. 246) were still 
lamenting that marketing had yet to “take the first step” towards becoming a science, even 
though this had been an objective of the community for at least 50 years. It was also the year 
in which the Ford and Carnegie Foundations published their reports on the state of US 
business education, which they criticised as being too descriptive and ‘unscientific’ (Gordon 
& Howell, 1959; Pierson, 1959).  Interestingly, the first of these reports, which comes to 500 
pages, barely mentions marketing but tellingly observes that “Most of the introductory 
courses in marketing that we examined spent too much time on descriptive detail” (Gordon & 
Howell, 1959, p. 189).  
The Ford Foundation’s pump-priming (at all levels) can justifiably be identified as the main 
reason for the sea-change in marketing practice, teaching and research after 1959, given the 
continuing failure to make marketing more scientific up to that time.  And the impact was 
quick and decisive.  As Brown (1996, p. 92) observed: “by the beginning of the 1960s, the 
battle had been decisively won by the scientific wannabes”, copper-fastened by the creation, 
in 1962, of the Marketing Science Institute whose goals were “(1) To contribute to the 
emergence of a more definitive science of marketing [and] (2) To stimulate increased 
application of scientific techniques to the understanding and solving of marketing problems” 
(Buzzell, 1963, p. 33).   And while the scientific wannabes might have prudently avoided 
making causal connections, their endeavours were certainly not diminished by the fact that 
these new approaches to marketing research, teaching and practice were accompanied by 
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continuing growth in the US economy during the 1960s.  As Day (1992, p. 324) put it, “the 
1960s were the era of marketing’s widest influence and greatest promise”. 
But if 1959 marked the point when marketing joined the intellectual bandwagon that had 
dominated post-war social science in the US, it also marked the start of a more robust critique 
of the quantitative paradigm outside of marketing.  We can illustrate this by recalling the 
story of James March, who was one of the intellectual powerhouses in GSIA where he 
worked from 1953 to 1964, during which time he co-authored two seminal books:  
Organizations (with Herbert Simon (1958)) and The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (with 
Richard Cyert (1963)).  GSIA was breaking up around 1964 and March decided to move to 
the University of California at Irvine where he continued to promote mathematical modelling, 
requiring all social science undergraduates to undergo a large amount of training in 
mathematics and statistics.  But intellectual fashions were changing: ethnomethodology, 
conversation analysis, and more ‘postmodern’ approaches to social inquiry were being 
formulated at that time and, indeed, in that place (March hired Harold Garfinkel and Harvey 
Sachs, the respective founders of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, as well as 
Jean Lave who made key contributions to the notion of situated learning).   Looking back, 
March was of the view that the attempt to advance the mathematical modelling project in 
Irvine during the 1960s “was poorly timed from the point of view of the flows of enthusiasms 
within social science … [I]t would have been better timed a decade or two earlier” (personal 
communication).  However, if the ‘flows of enthusiasms’ were moving elsewhere in the social 
sciences during the 1960s, this was hardly the case in marketing, where the passion for 
mathematics was only beginning to take hold.  Moreover, the Ford Foundation’s deep-root 
work meant that a paradigm – in the Kuhnian sense of a community holding a shared belief 
system about its practice – continued to renew itself over subsequent decades, assimilating 
contrary positions. 
Making Marketing Matter 
To end the story, we focus on the pivotal contribution made by Paul Anderson (1983) which 
Brown sees as marking a change from a pro-science era (1945–1983) to a pro-sciences era 
(1983–1999), and which Hunt (this issue) identifies as one of the most important 
contributions in marketing’s philosophy debates.  In this article, Marketing, Scientific 
Progress and Scientific Method, Anderson makes the important distinction between science1 
and science2 – hence the shift that Brown identifies from science to sciences – and proposes 
that the former (which we might refer to as positivism) “should refer to the idealized notion of 
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science as an inquiry system which produces ‘objectively proven knowledge’ (Chalmers 
1976, p. 1).  On this view, science seeks to discover ‘the truth’ via the objective methods of 
observation, test and experiment” (Anderson, 1983, p. 26).  As an alternative to this non-
existing system of inquiry, he then presents science2: 
“The defining element here is that of social consensus.  On this view science is whatever society 
chooses to call a science.  In Western cultures, this would include all of the recognized natural and 
social sciences.  Thus physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, economics, political science, 
etc., all count as science2.  This definition bears a resemblance to Madsen’s conceptualization of 
science as a socially organized information-producing activity whose procedures and norms are 
‘socially established’ (1974, p. 27)” (ibid, emphasis added).   
In my view, Anderson’s distinction between science1 and science2, despite being seen as so 
important in marketing’s philosophical debates, is profoundly problematic and indeed 
unhelpful for at least two reasons.  Firstly, he admits that nothing like science1 (but not 
science2) “has ever existed – nor is it very likely that such a system will ever exist” 
(Anderson, 1983, p. 26), which problematizes his definition, as well as biasing and hence 
weakening his argument.  Second, and more importantly, he makes no distinction between the 
natural and social sciences, and it is this point that I shall now develop.  To do so, I turn to the 
work of Bent Flyvbjerg. 
Bent Flyvbjerg’s (2001) book Making Social Science Matter has had a considerable impact 
since it first appeared in 2001. Now in its tenth printing, it has been reviewed by more than a 
hundred journals and magazines, including Science and the Times Literary Supplement. A 
central part of Flyvbjerg’s argument is that social science has failed in its attempt to emulate 
the natural sciences and will continue to fail as long as it pursues theory-driven abstract 
knowledge of universal rationality.  Drawing on Giddens’ (1982) notion of the ‘double 
hermeneutic’, Flyvbjerg argues that there is a critical difference between the natural and 
social sciences in that “the former studies physical objects while the latter studies self-
reflecting humans and must therefore take account of changes in the interpretation of the 
objects of study” (2001, p. 32).  In other words, because social scientists study humans, they 
are necessarily offering interpretations of other people’s interpretations.  Furthermore, the 
people being studied can include the social scientist’s interpretations in their interpretations, 
creating a dynamic, dialogic relationship between the people being studied and the people 
doing the studying.   Crucially, this cannot happen in the natural sciences because “the objects 
of study are not self-interpreting entities: they do not talk back” (p. 33), which is why 
Anderson’s failure to make this distinction is so important.   
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Social science fails when it seeks to create time-tested theories of a static social reality, while 
natural science fails when it tries to offer a reflexive analysis of goals, interests and values in 
a particular social and historical context.  To develop this point, Flyvbjerg draws on 
Aristotle’s distinction between three different types of knowledge: epistemé, techné and 
phronesis:    
Epistemé concerns universals and the production of knowledge which is invariable in time and space, 
and which is achieved with the aid of analytical rationality.  Epistemé corresponds to the modern 
scientific ideal as expressed in natural science… 
Techné can be translated into English as ‘art’ in the sense of ‘craft’; a craftsman is also an artisan… 
Whereas epistemé concerns theoretical know why and techné denotes technical know how, phronesis 
emphasizes practical knowledge and practical ethics.  Phronesis is often translated as ‘prudence’ or 
‘practical common sense.’” (p. 55–56, original emphasis).   
 
Table 1 distinguishes the elements of this tripartite scheme, drawing on Dunne (1993): 
------ 
Insert Table 1 around here 
------ 
Returning to marketing’s philosophical debate, we can see that this tripartite scheme offers 
quite a different framing device compared to the art–science and science1–science2 
dichotomies.  Crucially, it makes the distinction between techné (art) and phronesis (ethics), 
which is missing from the way in which marketing’s debate about matters philosophical is 
routinely structured as an issue about whether marketing is an art or a science.  For instance 
Vaile (1949), in his commentary on Alderson and Cox’s (1948) call to make marketing more 
scientific, asserts that: “When all is said and done, marketing will remain an art in which 
innovation and extravaganza will continue to play an important, albeit unpredictable part” 
(Vaile, 1949, p. 522), a point that Hutchison (1952, p. 289) echoes when he asserts that 
“marketing is not a science. It is rather an art or a practice, and as such more closely 
resembles engineering, medicine and architecture than it does physics, chemistry or biology.” 
Hutchinson’s use of the word ‘practice’ is important here, as is his identification of marketing 
with engineering, medicine and architecture, each of which is a ‘practice’ in the 
understanding of the term popularised by the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981/1984) 
who, like Flyvbjerg, draws on Aristotle’s writings.   For MacIntyre, a practice is  
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. (p. 187) 
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Now, while there is a debate about whether or not management (and by extension marketing) 
is a practice, in MacIntyre’s understanding of the term (Kavanagh, 2012), one can at least 
argue that it is, and that, like engineering, it is constituted by a community of practitioners.   
Here, we can usefully link MacIntyre and Flyvbjerg because the former emphasises the role 
of virtues and ethics – which are always situated contextually and historically – within the 
traditions of particular practices, while the latter sees phronesis as the general wisdom that 
emerges through engaging in particular practices.   
Finding phronesis in the detritus 
One benefit of reviewing the evolution of marketing’s philosophical debate is that it makes 
clear that matters relating to ethics were of more central concern to the marketing community 
before it passed the watershed year of 1959 on its way to becoming more ‘scientific’.  In 
marketing’s early years, “the societal domain was an implicit issue in the body of marketing 
thought” (Wilkie & Moore, 2003, p. 118), probably reflecting the influence of the German 
historical school, which was very much concerned with addressing contemporary social 
problems.    
There is plenty of other evidence that the concept of phronesis was important during the early 
decades of the twentieth century even if that word might not have been used.   For instance, 
Veblen (1908, 1919) presented an important critique of marketing-related activities at that 
time, while Percival White adopted a clear ethical stance in his writing, seeing good ethics to 
be good business and highlighting the long-term downside of treating customers badly (Jones 
& Tadajewski, 2011).     
The same themes are to be found in subsequent decades.  For instance, Tadajewski (2010) 
highlights how Lynd (1936) and Rorty (1934) unpicked “the assumptions that undergirded the 
legitimacy of business and marketing practice” (p. 779) and he also notes how Paul 
Lazarsfeld used Marxism as a theoretical sensitizing device in his market research studies 
around 1930 and his later critique of “promotional culture” (Lazarsfeld, 1941).  In addition, a 
number of contributions to the early decades of the Journal of Marketing show that the 
concepts of practice (from MacIntyre) and phronesis (from Flyvbjerg) were integral to the 
conversation about marketing between 1931, when the American Marketing Society was 
founded, and 1959.  Most obviously, one of that society’s two goals was to “formulate 
standards or principles in marketing” (Kerin, 1996, p. 1) (the other goal being to “advance 
science in marketing”).  
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This focus on standards and ethical principles is made explicit in a paper by Paul Cherington 
(1937), first president of the American Marketing Association.  Born in 1876, Cherington 
worked for the US Shipping Board and the National Association of Wool Manufacturers 
before becoming, in 1922, Director of Research at the advertising agency, J. Walter 
Thompson Company, where he worked until he became a partner in McKinsey and Company 
in 1939.  During his varied career in industry he also found time to teach marketing in 
Harvard, Stanford and New York University (Crossley, 1956).  While Cherington was 
committed to making marketing more ‘scientific’, ethical issues run through his short paper, 
Marketing Marketing, as this extract makes clear: 
In a branch of human activity which is trying to formulate itself into some semblance of a science, there 
are necessarily the serious problems of maintaining exacting professional and scientific standards, of 
guarding ourselves and our reputations against the wild doings and claims of the charlatans and the 
camp-followers, and of sifting out the good and constructive new developments from those which are 
merely the fruits of misguided zeal. But we have, at the same time, a more serious and urgent problem 
in getting a world, which has got on a long time without us, to believe that we really do have something 
to contribute to human welfare. (p. 233)  
He exhorts his audience of marketing practitioners “always to focus our selling emphasis on 
the professional quality of our work” while he warns those with academic connections that 
“care should be taken to differentiate between individual and institutional standing and 
reputation. There are some nice questions of ethics involved here which should be frankly 
discussed” (p. 224). He also asks for respect for those that have “worked out a specialised 
field” of endeavour and that these should not be subjected to “imitation or price-slashing” by 
other marketing professionals (p. 224–5).   For Cherington, good marketing practice is “not 
bragging about our virtues, but seeing that they are there, and getting our clients to brag about 
them for us” (p. 225).  While one might take issue with Cherington’s points, what is 
interesting is the degree to which his ideas are situated within the domain of phronesis.  
Berna’s (1937) article on fair trade practices in the machine tool industry takes a somewhat 
similar tack.  As General Manager of the National Machine Tool Builders’ Association, Berna 
represented machine tool companies, which he said were founded and operated by “practical 
men,” who had the “pride of a skilled mechanic in fine workmanship” and are “traditionally 
scornful of sharp practice, high pressure selling and untested ideas” (p. 129).    He also noted 
a unique feature of his industry, namely that the machine tool is “the only type of man-made 
equipment that can be used to reproduce itself”, which means that “a company may be a 
competitor and a customer.  This tends to make friends of competitors and has created an 
atmosphere of mutual respect and courtesy that is most constructive” (ibid.).  Moreover, 
because of the relatively small number of metal-working shops, “we sell over and over to the 
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same customers.  We must wear well”.   He then criticises recent government legislation, 
partly because it will increase costs that must be passed on to the customer, but more 
importantly because it displays, for him, a lack of appreciation for the industry’s professional 
standards and ethics, in other words, for its phronesis.  To illustrate these standards, he 
includes a list of principles set out by a Mr MacLeod, then President of the National Machine 
Tool Builders’ Association.  These ten principles articulated (1) a belief in “energetic but 
clean and honest” competition; (2) a pledge “to be tolerant in our attitude towards” other 
industries; (3) a belief “in the advantages of cooperative effort”; (4) support for “our 
Democratic form of government” and a pledge “to take an active interest in National and 
Local political affairs”; (5) a pledge to “manage our business [so] that the greatest value will 
accrue to investor, workman, and consumer”; (6) a pledge “to discontinue products which do 
not have a promise of showing reasonable profits”; (7) a pledge to “continually strive to 
improve [workers’] conditions”; (8) a pledge “to do our part to help in balancing production 
and consumption”; (9) a pledge “to common decency in business as expressed in our own 
Code of Ethics”; (10) a pledge to “strive for even greater standards” to maintain “the 
American standard of living and human welfare generally” (p. 131).  Again, there is an ethical 
dimension to each of these principles, and even if they might be seen as self-serving rhetoric, 
the fact is that Bern saw fit to highlight and write about them, while, in turn, the editors of the 
Journal of Marketing thought his paper warranted publication.        
Another paper from that period was by Clarence Francis, President of General Foods, based 
on his address to the American Marketing Association (Francis, 1938).  In this paper, Francis 
argues that marketing’s purpose is to help raise living standards in the United Stateas, whose 
President had recently admitted that “a third of the nation is ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-
housed” (p. 27).  Francis calls for “a more cooperative spirit between government, labor, and 
business”; a distinction between laws that seek to make competition fairer and laws that are 
designed to put someone out of business; more market facts “for all to use in a great program 
of national betterment” (p. 33); more easily understood language – “talk the language of the 
people when we go before the court of public opinion and seek to merit the responsibility 
allotted us” (p. 33); and, finally, to “give youngsters a break” by teaching them best business 
practice.  He ends his talk by asserting that “Active service in the American Marketing 
Association . . . is one form of patriotism, practically applied!” (ibid., emphasis and ellipsis in 
original). 
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The American Marketing Association was itself centrally concerned with ‘professionalising’ 
the practice of marketing which meant more than making it more ‘scientific’, and this is why, 
in 1942, it created a Committee on Professional Standards and Status with the remit of 
formulating “a set of standards governing professional competence and professional ethics in 
the field of marketing” (Haring, 1942, p. 334).  Part of the reason for this focus on 
professional ethics was because the Federal Trade Commission, which was founded in 1914, 
had spent much of its first 30 years investigating false and misleading advertising (according 
to its chair, Robert Elliot Freer, who was also an occasional contributor to the Journal of 
Marketing (Freer, 1938, 1949)). 
In 1958, Lyndon Brown set out what he saw as the necessary steps that marketing needed to 
take to become a profession.  While Brown was in the van of the pro-science programme – 
and this belief in science ran through much of his manifesto – the fourth of his five steps 
identified the need for “a continued rise in professional standards and ethics” (Brown, 1948L 
29). He also saw ethics as something that was deeply embedded in the practice of marketing:  
“It is my personal belief that professional ethics and standards cannot be legislated, that they 
must grow out of practice, particularly since our work is inextricably interwoven with a 
private enterprise economy” (ibid; emphasis added). 
In his well-cited article, Is Marketing a Science, Buzzell (1963) places himself firmly in the 
pro-science camp, though he acknowledges that “most managers who are responsible for day-
to-day decisions are still typically inclined to distrust generalizations” (Buzzell, 1963, p. 34).  
He also quotes a speech given by Charles Ramond of the Advertising Research Foundation 
that strongly echoes the difference Flyvbjerg (and others) make between the natural and the 
social sciences: 
'The businessman's practical wisdom is of a completely different character than scientific knowledge.  
While it does not ignore generalities, it recognizes the low probability that given combinations of 
phenomena can or will be repeated ... In place of scientific knowledge, then, the businessman collects 
lore'. (ibid, original ellipsis) 
Each of these contributions illustrate – and are a historical record of – a (US) community’s 
concern with phronesis, and its reflexive discussion on the right way to conduct the practices 
that constitute that community.       
Conclusion: from epistemé-techné to phronesis 
Another reason why 1959 can be seen as a watershed year is that in that year the Journal of 
Marketing published one of its last ‘phronetic’ papers, by which I mean a critical-ethical 
paper on marketing practice, written by a marketing practitioner.  In this case the author was 
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William Borton, a marketing researcher and management consultant. In his article, titled 
‘Respectability for Marketing’, Borton questioned the usefulness of marketing’s mission if it 
is just “to switch buyers to their particular brand … or to induce people to buy and consume 
more and still more goods” (Borton, 1959, p. 47).  For Borton, a philosophy of simply 
increasing sales is hardly sufficient given that “problems of obesity and discussions of current 
automobiles are evidences that, past a certain point, quantity of goods consumed bears little 
relationship to human welfare” (p. 48).   
As the hypothetico-deductive paradigm took hold, this type of essay – by a practitioner, for 
practitioners – all but disappeared (Twedt (1963) and Blankenship (1964) are rare exceptions) 
and now practitioners rarely, if ever, contribute to the leading marketing journals.  This is 
quite in contrast to the 1930s to 1950s as is clear from Applebaum’s (1947) review of the first 
ten years of the Journal of Marketing.  Applebaum, who was himself an executive with the 
supermarket chain, Stop & Shop, computed that of the 499 articles published in the journal’s 
first ten years, 39 per cent were authored by ‘university teachers’, 15 per cent by government 
employees, and 46 per cent by business practitioners.  The evidence is that these practitioners 
used the journal as a forum to discuss and advocate ethical marketing practice, or what we 
might describe as phronesis.  Unfortunately, the concerted attempt during the 1950s to make 
marketing teaching and practice less descriptive and more scientific meant that the 
practitioners decamped, and with no practitioners there could be no meaningful phronesis.  Of 
course the journals did publish papers on marketing ethics (e.g. Bartels (1967)) and a new 
interest in macromarketing emerged (Bartels & Jenkins, 1977), but by that time almost all the 
practitioners had left the conversation.  This is important in the story about how philosophical 
discourse in marketing evolved, because the narrative is not just about the flow of ideas, but 
also about who is – and who is not – participating in the debate. 
Tellingly, as the practitioners left the debate, the amount of criticism of business declined, 
with Tadajewski (2010) observing that there was little, if any, criticism of business interests 
by marketing academics during the 1960s.  This phenomenon appears to have continued to 
the present day, based on the fact that both MacIntyre and Flyvbjerg have been virtually 
ignored within marketing discourse – only a few papers in marketing journals reference their 
work – even though both are highly cited across the social sciences.2  This is unfortunate as 
MacIntyre’s ideas on practice (and the attendant ethical issues that he brings to bear) and 
Flyvbjerg’s notion of phronesis should be worthy of inclusion in any debate about the nature 
of marketing theory and practice.   
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Looking forward, it can help to look backward.  In his study of the influence of the German 
historical school on the development of academic life in the United states, Herbst observed 
that American students studying in Germany in the late 1890s gained “a craftsman’s regard 
for technical expertise, an unfailing respect for accuracy, and a concern for the application of 
knowledge and skills to social ends” (Herbst, 1965, p. 19, quoted in Jones and Monieson 
1990, p. 103).  Today, Flyvbjerg’s tripartite scheme has similar distinctions and ambitions: 
techné, or the “craftsman’s regard for technical expertise”, epistemé, or the “unfailing respect 
for accuracy”, and phronesis or a “concern for the application of knowledge and skills to 
social ends”.  And the most important of these is phronesis. 
Note 
1. While women were largely absent from the science debates, they did contribute to the 
early development of marketing theory and practice (though their influence has tended to be 
neglected (Zuckerman & Carsky, 1990)).  In particular, home economists like Christine 
Frederick, Hazel Kyrk and Elizabeth Hoyt contributed to consumer behaviour theory, while 
Pauline Arnold did pioneering work in marketing research.  For further accounts of the female 
contribution to marketing thought and practice see the Journal of Historical Research in 
Marketing, 2013, Volume 5(3). 
2. I thank D.G. Brian Jones for introducing me to the work of David D. Monieson (1981, 
1988), whose writings on ‘usable knowledge’ and the ‘intellectualisation’ of marketing 
resonates with Flyvbjerg’s distinctions between techné, epistemé and phronesis. 
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